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Abstract
South Africa relies heavily on imported crude oil.
Domestic sources and available substitutes alone
cannot satisfy the country’s current demand, result-
ing in imported crude oil accounting for over 90%
of South Africa’s requirements. This high level of
dependence on imported crude oil exposes the
economy to potential events that either interrupts
supplies or leads to higher oil prices thereby under-
mining economic growth and development.
Widening diversity of supply, demand-side meas-
ures and maintaining strategic inventories will
strengthen energy security. 
Keywords: vulnerability, security, dependence,
diversification
Introduction
This paper focuses on energy security in South
Africa. Oil is a major component of the energy mix,
so that energy security in our context is about
reducing vulnerability of and dependence on oil
imports. Vulnerability arises from a number of fac-
tors, such as collusion among oil exporting coun-
tries and insufficient diversification, growing
dependence on imported sources of oil, demand/
supply imbalance leading to exporter instability,
and political instability of exporting countries. There
are compelling reasons for South Africa as a net oil
importer to be concerned with energy security. First,
domestic oil production falls far short from meeting
the country’s requirements, and there are no eco-
nomically and readily available substitutes to
replace imported crude oil on a large scale. Second,
oil resources are spatially concentrated in a few
countries, and South Africa depends heavily (over
90%) on outside sources for its oil imports, with
94% of its crude oil requirements in 2003 coming
from three OPEC producers (SAPIA, 2003). Third,
because of oil’s key role in supporting economic
growth and development, any conflicts, wars, pro-
duction cutbacks or supply disruption by OPEC
producers pose a threat to South Africa’s oil imports
with wide ramifications on social development and
economic growth.
In what follows, I first discuss issues linked to
demand and reliance on crude oil. I then devote
attention to the cost of energy dependence. The
final section looks at ways of addressing energy
insecurity by focusing specifically on strategies such
as widening diversity of supply, demand-side meas-
ures and maintaining strategic inventories.
Demand and reliance on crude oil
Crude oil accounts for about 17% of South Africa’s
primary energy needs (SANEA, 2003). About 86%
of the crude oil imports come from three countries:
Saudi Arabia (36%), Iran (34%) and Nigeria (16%)
in 2006. Figure 1 shows diversified sources of sup-
ply and fluctuations in crude oil imports and local
production. Saudi Arabia’s oil import shares have
became dominant, rising from 10% in 1997, over-
taking Iranian imports by 1999 and rising to 46% in
2003, and 36% in 2006. The share of Iranian
imports, on the other hand, fell from 51% in 1997
to 33.7% in 2003 and 2006. The Nigerian import
share rose from 5% in 1997 to 17% in 2003 and
2006. Crude oil imports from the rest of the sources
fell from 33% in 1997 to 13% in 2006, while local
production has fluctuated around 3.1%. Payment
for imported supplies is in US dollars. Purchases in
US dollars imply that the Dollar-Rand exchange
rates are very important to domestic price move-
ments. A weaker Rand implies more money to pur-
chase crude oil leading, in turn, to higher fuel
prices. 
Dependence on outside sources leaves South
Africa vulnerable to factors beyond its control such
as oil price shocks and supply disruptions due to
political and other external factors. Price fluctua-
tions result in a flow of foreign exchange resources
to oil producers, which would otherwise be used to
stimulate the economy. Oil prices have fluctuated,
and the trend has been upward. Reasons behind
price increases from 1973 to 2006 beyond South
Africa’s influence include: 
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• The 1973/74 price shock. The price shock was
both political and demand led (triggered by the
Yom Kippur war and an Arab oil embargo,
which included South Africa). World demand
had been growing by 7.7% since 1965, and oil
prices quadrupled. The use of oil as a weapon at
this time demonstrated that it was a blunt instru-
ment that cannot be applied in a focused man-
ner. The economies of both embargoed and
untargeted oil-importing countries were nega-
tively affected, and oil importing developing
countries suffered more adverse economic
impacts than the rich industrialized states. The
inflation and monetary instability that followed
affected South Africa.
• The 1979/80 price spike that was politically driv-
en, and triggered by the Iranian revolution in
1979. Prices tripled. In consequence, many cen-
tral banks raised interest rates contributing to
international recession.
• The 1990/91 price spike. The price spike was
brief, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and
collapsed not long afterwards with the invasion
of Iraq. South Africa was already facing a down-
turn in economic activity because of a combina-
tion of factors such as weak demand of exports,
its tight monetary policy, early phases of domes-
tic drought, and political uncertainty.
• The September 11 2001 attack that sent prices
rocketing. 
• Demand led growth of other economies. Prices
trebled between 2003 and 2006. The price rise
was demand led and mainly attributable to glob-
al economic growth led by China – fuelled infla-
tion, led to an interest rate tightening cycle, and
contributed in the fall in economic growth.
Continued increase in prices threatened a reduc-
tion in disposable income, household consump-
tion spending and a rise in second-round infla-
tion.
There is debate in the literature about the nature
of the current price of oil. One school of thought is
that these prices are of a cyclical nature because of
reversible factors pushing in the same direction. The
other school of thought is that contrary to being
cyclical, the oil prices are structural and reflect insuf-
ficient investment over the past years (Stevens,
2004). The important point to note is that if the cur-
rent prices are cyclical they will eventually go down,
and that they will remain high if they are structural.
Either way, stability of oil prices at acceptable levels
is crucial in securing supply. Even with stable price
increases, following Hornsell’s (1999) contention,
the price of oil adjusts upwards (or is sticky) and
balances supplies.
Demand for oil is demand inelastic in the medi-
um term for reasons that there are no immediate
substitutes for oil and consumers do not have flexi-
bility to switch to other fuels. High crude oil is
imported exposing South Africa to a number of
events that could either interrupt supplies or lead to
higher oil prices thereby undermining economic
growth and development. If South Africa is to main-
tain a cogent energy security plan, the following
issues deserve serious attention:
• Access to reliable, affordable, clean, sufficient
and sustainable sources of energy to meet
demand at affordable prices;
• Promotion of diverse energy resources; and
• Promoting sustainable development in energy
planning. By creating a link between supply and
demand, key consideration should be on eco-
nomic growth, poverty alleviation, and promot-
ing environmental integrity.
The cost of dependence 
Oil dependence has its costs. The domestic eco-
nomic impact of higher crude oil price changes,
holding other factors constant, is predictable. Oil
price increases the cost of liquid fuel relative to
other factors as an input in production, squeezes
the margins of companies, and leads to transfer of
income to the oil exporting country through shifts in
the terms of trade. Excessive price increases or oil
‘price shocks’ exacerbate the macroeconomic dis-
ruptions caused by oil price shocks. This causes dis-
location in some sectors of the economy, reduces
real national income of the importing country, and
leads to a reduction in aggregate demand for
goods. The magnitude of these effects, however,
depends on the degree of dependence and the oil
price elasticity of demand. The resulting speed of
adjustment – often dictated by the real wage, price
and structural rigidities in the economy – adds to
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Figure 1: South Africa’s crude oil imports and
own production, 1997 – 2006
Source: SAPIA (2006)
the direct income effect of the oil price increase,
with higher prices triggering inflation, increased
input and transport costs in the economy and, ulti-
mately, lower investment. All this compromises eco-
nomic growth. Bacon (2005), for example, esti-
mates that the average impact of a US$10 a barrel
price increase translates to a shock lowering the
GDP by 0.8%, and increases inflation by 1.2%.
While Bacon’s estimates are in aggregate terms, the
impact would be more revealing with disaggregated
estimates of different end users, particularly the
transport sector. 
Table 1 shows South Africa’s degree of oil
dependence and the oil intensity of the economy.
Energy intensity, the energy use per dollar of GDP
or the amount of energy needed to support eco-
nomic activity. High energy intensity is mainly
because of the energy intensive activities within the
economy, and implies the potential for improve-
ment in efficiency. The degree of energy intensity is
an indicator of vulnerability, and a high intensity
implies the economy is more vulnerable to oil price
increases. A plot of energy intensities from 1994 to
2003 reveals a negative trend line for South Africa,
indicating a potential for both efficiency improve-
ments and for keeping vulnerability down. Oil fuel
dependence, on the other hand did not change
between 1997 and 2003, precluding expectations
of large changes in the medium term. However, the
constant trend over time (see Table 1) may indicate
absence of or limited input substitution taking place.
The overall conclusion from Table 1 is that there is
little prospect of South Africa reducing its import
dependence at least, in the medium term. 
Table 1: Oil vulnerability in South Africa
Calculated from International Energy Agency
publications
1997 2000 2003
Energy intensity 35 858 36 000 35 348
Oil dependence 20% 20% 20%
Oil vulnerability 52% 56% 55%
Oil import dependence 100% 94% 94%
Notes:
Energy intensity y= total primary energy consumption per
dollar of gross domestic product
Oil dependence computed as ratio of petroleum consumption
to total primary energy consumption
Oil vulnerability calculated as (oil consumption – oil
production)/oil consumption
Oil import dependence = (net oil imports/oil consumption)
Addressing energy insecurity 
There are various approaches to the problem of
energy security. One view is that energy security
should focus on the proper functioning of the econ-
omy, with uninterrupted availability of the energy
resource at an affordable price (EU, 2000). In line
with this view, the policy objective of security of
supply is to reduce risks linked to dependence
rather than attempting to maximize energy self-suf-
ficiency or minimizing dependence. Another view
accepts dependence on imports, but advocates for
diverse sources of supply with no dominant suppli-
er, enabling the economy to produce sufficient
goods and services affordably (Egenhofer et al.,
2004). In yet another approach, the IEA (2001)
places responsibility on governments to reduce the
risk of supply disruptions. While I consider these
various approaches to be complementary, I now
address the issue of minimizing disruptions of sup-
ply by focusing specifically on the following: widen-
ing diversity of supply, demand-side measures and
maintaining strategic inventories. 
Widening diversity of supply 
Given how vital oil is to the functioning of the econ-
omy, any form of instability or disruption of supply
may affect production costs, the purchasing power
of private consumers, investment, and possible
social conflict. One of the solutions to the problem
to widen domestic sources of energy is to replace, in
part, the supply of lost oil, and/or to decrease
demand for oil from external sources and thus
reduce the impact of oil price increases. 
Widening diversity of supply involves develop-
ing domestic resources and diversifying fuel types.
High global oil prices make domestic potential
investments attractive, provide an incentive to
develop known but previously uneconomic
resources, and encourage exploration. Figure 2 pro-
vides a link between supply and demand by show-
ing South Africa’s diverse energy resource flows,
and their transformation (in refineries), transporta-
tion (road, rail and pipeline), and end uses. The
energy sources shown offer some scope for substi-
tution with liquid fuels particularly in industry and
commerce, and the household sectors. The domi-
nance of coal in the primary energy supply is clear,
with recoverable reserves of 55 000 Mt. Coal
accounts for 95% of electricity production – South
Africa is classified as “water stressed”, and therefore
has limited potential for hydropower – and 23% of
liquid petroleum production. Coal and natural gas
resources are converted to liquid fuels (petrol,
diesel, paraffin and polymers) in Sasol and PetroSA
refineries, and account for about 30% of the coun-
try’s liquid fuel products. Products refined locally
from imported crude oil meet the balance. Local
refining capacity has increased from 651 000 bar-
rels/day in 1997 to 708 000 barrels/day in 2006
(see Table 2). Coal is not currently viable to supply
the entire country’s liquid fuel demand from coal-
to-liquid fuel. 
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Table 2: Capacity of South African refineries
(billion barrels/day)
Source: SAPIA (2006)
Refineries 1992 1997 2006
Sapref 120 000 165 000 180 000
Enref 70 000 105 000 125 000
Calref 50 000 100 000 100 000
Natref 78 000 86 000 108 000
Sasol 150 000* 150 000* 150 000*
PetroSA 45 000* 45 000* 45 000*
Total 513 000 615 000 708 000
* Crude equivalent
South Africa has small but economically impor-
tant offshore oil and gas resources. Oil in the
Oribi/Oryx Oil Field and the Sable Oil Fields has
proven reserves of 49 million barrels, and the
Oribi/Oryx Oil Fields produced 4.6 million barrels in
2002 (SANEA, 2003). Production in the Sable Oil
Field began in 2003. This source has the potential
to replace 7% to 10% of the imported oil. Certified
natural gas reserves are insufficient to justify a
major switch to gas. F-A Field is the only gas field in
production. With prospects of this gas field running
out in 2008, explorations are underway in adjacent
fields. The largest gas reserve, Ibhubesi Gas Field, is
undergoing development, with other reserves off
the West Coast under investigation. High oil prices
should provide an incentive to develop these
domestic opportunities and to reduce South Africa’s
vulnerability to increases in international oil prices. 
Demand-side measures
Demand-side measures take into account policies
that influence a real change in consumer behaviour.
The objective of such policies can be multi-fold, but
can be aimed at enhancing energy saving, promot-
ing energy efficiency, reducing oil intensity, and
maintaining stable prices. Fiscal measures – taxes
and/or subsidies – tend to be effective since they
work through the price system. The argument in
support of petroleum taxation is that this restraint
measure helps to steer demand towards better-con-
trolled consumption and to conserve foreign
exchange, it does not require a major administrative
system, and it allows the market to allocate the
petroleum products. Following this line of thinking,
taxation discourages liquid fuel consumption, and
triggers efficient energy use. 
There are, however, problems associated with
this approach. This measure alone cannot guaran-
tee that private and diverse producers and con-
sumers will react in a desired way. If demand is
price-inelastic, given the short run fixity of energy
consuming capital and constraints on energy con-
suming replacement appliances, reducing con-
sumption will be limited as prices rise. There is
always a danger that taxes on oil imports will
increase production and consumer costs, act regres-
sively in income redistribution, and risk reducing
the competitiveness of the country’s exports.
Maintaining strategic inventories
One way of circumventing disruptions to crude oil
supplies is to maintain a strategic stockpile as a con-
tingency against supply interruptions. Storing crude
oil stocks instead of petroleum products offers sev-
eral advantages: crude oil is cheaper to store, its
quality is technically easier to maintain, and it pro-
vides flexibility in processing to products to meet
demand during times of supply disruption. The
strategic stockpile can be held and not to be
allowed to run down beyond a target figure. The
administrative and storage costs of such a policy is
insignificant if one takes into account the opportu-
nity cost of tied-up capital. 
Given that inventories are costly to build, it
makes sense to build them when oil prices are antic-
ipated to increase at a rate greater than the oppor-
tunity cost of money. The cost of oil shortage to the
economy is enormous. The DME (2006) estimates
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Figure 2: South Africa’s energy flows
the cost of fuel shortage (using 2005 prices) to be
273 cents per litre, and at least R925 million a day.
The larger the inventories held the less likely will be
the damaging impact of any trade disruptions, since
the inventory held can be used to mitigate and
smooth erratic oil supply shortage, thereby mini-
mizing security risks involved in import depend-
ence. The strategic stockpile of oil reserves offers
protection against a major supply disruption, but
the scope and duration of this protection depends
on the quantities held.
Challenge
Energy policy faces a challenge of achieving the
goal of significantly lowering oil dependence from
external sources and of reducing energy insecurity.
Achieving these goals will not be easy and will take
a long-term to accomplish. Indeed, there are supply
and demand measures that are relevant in an
attempt to reduce energy insecurity. However, these
are not the only measures available to reduce the
demand for imported oil. Other policy measures
that promote conservation, energy efficiency and
quantitative restrictions on imports affect the
demand for imported crude oil are additional poli-
cy measures available. 
Like other policy measures, it is important to
pursue them efficiently and manage them centrally.
Of preference is a method that works through the
price system so that if the price on all oil rises, its
effect, depending on the price elasticity of demand,
will be to discourage consumption, encourage
domestic supply and discouraging crude oil
imports. Market forces, once allowed to play their
part, allocate energy efficiently and simplify other
aspects of energy policy. Issues of oil dependence,
vulnerability and indigenous supply potential
remain key concerns for energy policy, and demand
strong emergency response measures.
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